Suchergebnisse

Scholars in philosophy, law, economics and other fields have widely debated how science, environmental precaution, and economic interests should be balanced in urgent contemporary problems, such as climate change. One controversial focus of these discussions is the precautionary principle, according to which scientific uncertainty should not be a reason for delay in the face of serious threats to the environment or health. While the precautionary principle has been very influential, no generally accepted definition of it exists and critics charge that it is incoherent or hopelessly vague. This book presents and defends an interpretation of the precautionary principle from the perspective of philosophy of science, looking particularly at how it connects to decisions, scientific procedures, and evidence. Through careful analysis of numerous case studies, it shows how this interpretation leads to important insights on scientific uncertainty, intergenerational justice, and the relationship between values and policy-relevant science. -- Back cover

This reply to Erik Weber's commentary agrees that mechanisms are important for causal inference in social science, but argues that Weber makes the mistake that was the main focus of my original essay: inferring that since a problem cannot be solved without mechanisms, it can be solved with them. As it stands, this inference is invalid since the problem might be unsolvable with or without mechanisms. Any claim about the usefulness of mechanisms for some purpose requires an adequate account of how mechanisms can actually fulfill that function, which Weber has not provided with regard to the issues he discusses.

This article examines methodological individualism in terms of the theory that invariance under intervention is the signal feature of generalizations that serve as a basis for causal explanation. This theory supports the holist contention that macro-level generalizations can explain, but it also suggests a defense of methodological individualism on the grounds that greater range of invariance under intervention entails deeper explanation. Although this individualist position is not threatened by multiple-realizability, an argument for it based on rational choice theory is called into question by experimental results concerning preference reversals.

Several authors have claimed that mechanisms play a vital role in distinguishing between causation and mere correlation in the social sciences. Such claims are sometimes interpreted to mean that without mechanisms, causal inference in social science is impossible. The author agrees with critics of this proposition but explains how the account of how mechanisms aid causal inference can be interpreted in a way that does not depend on it. Nevertheless, he shows that this more charitable version of the account is still unsuccessful as it stands. Consequently, he advances a proposal for shoring up the account, which is founded on the possibility of acquiring knowledge of social mechanisms by linking together norms or practices found in a society.

AbstractPro-diversity beliefs hold that greater diversity leads to better results in academia, business, politics and a variety of other contexts. This paper explores the possibility that pro-diversity beliefs can generate unfair expectations that marginalized people produce distinctive bonuses, a phenomenon we refer to as the "diverse person's burden". We suggest that a normic conception of diversity, according to which non-diversity entails social privilege, together with empirical research on psychological entitlement suggests an explanation of how the diverse person's burden can arise in many social settings. We also suggest structural and institutional remedies to address the diverse person's burden, as well as an individual virtue we label positional awareness.

AbstractThe precautionary principle is often argued to be irrational because it cannot adequately explain how resources should be distributed across multiple possible catastrophes or between catastrophic and noncatastrophic risks. We address this problem of trade‐offs by extending a recently proposed formal interpretation of the precautionary principle (PP) within a lexical utility framework and using it to prove results about which distribution of resources maximizes lexical utility when several catastrophic risks exist, given different assumptions. We also explain how our lexical utility interpretation of PP can recommend balanced distributions of resources between disaster prevention and other concerns.

This article examines the business case for diversity (BCD), according to which diversity should be promoted because diverse groups outperform nondiverse groups. Philosophers who defend BCD usually propose that diversity's positive effects are contingent on equitable background conditions that promote respectful and open discourse, suggesting that efforts to promote equity and to reap the benefits of diversity go hand-in-hand. Yet we explain how epistemic benefits of diversity can depend on inequities, including inequalities of intellectual authority along the lines of social identity. Consequently, we propose a more complete account of the complex relationship between equity and epistemic benefits of diversity.

In this article, we claim that recent developments in climate science and renewable energy should prompt a reframing of debates surrounding climate change mitigation. Taken together, we argue that these developments suggest (1) global climate collapse in this century is a non-negligible risk, (2) mitigation offers substantial benefits to current generations, and (3) mitigation by some can generate social tipping dynamics that could ultimately make renewables cheaper than fossil fuels. We explain how these claims undermine familiar framings of climate change, wherein mitigation is understood as self-sacrifice that individuals and governments must be morally persuaded or incentivized to undertake.

AbstractWe suggest that philosophical accounts of epistemic effects of diversity have given insufficient attention to the relationship between demographic diversity and information elaboration (IE), the process whereby knowledge dispersed in a group is elicited and examined. We propose an analysis of IE that clarifies hypotheses proposed in the empirical literature and their relationship to philosophical accounts of diversity effects. Philosophical accounts have largely overlooked the possibility that demographic diversity may improve group performance by enhancing IE, and sometimes fail to explore the relationship between diversity and IE altogether. We claim these omissions are significant from both a practical and theoretical perspective. Moreover, we explain how the overlooked explanations suggest that epistemic benefits of diversity can depend on epistemically unjust social dynamics.

AbstractSeveral scholars have proposed that values embedded in science are a central reason why more research does not necessarily resolve scientific controversies around complex environmental issues. In the Capital Regional District, British Columbia, Canada, scientists have positioned themselves for and against the construction of a wastewater treatment plant in a debate framed as purely technical. This study explores the link between the scientists' positions in the debate and the way they, in their scientific publications, portray nature and environmental risks. We performed a qualitative content analysis of peer‐reviewed publications by scientists who have publicly taken opposing positions in the controversy. We found that scientists against treatment predominantly frame nature as tolerant, up to a limit, to disturbances and potential risks, and they seem to embrace a view of science as capable of reducing uncertainties. In contrast, scientists in favor of treatment predominantly portray nature as fragile, particularly toward human‐mobilized environmental risks and they commonly present scientific uncertainty as worrisome based on potentially harmful consequences. Our study suggests that value‐laden perspectives impact scientists' positions even in a seemingly technical controversy.